

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

6 September 1951

SUBJECT: NIE 29/2: Supplement to NIE 29 "Probability of an
Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951" and NIE 29/1
(20 March and 4 May, 1951)
(Draft Terms of Reference for the IAC representatives)

THE PROBLEM

To review the conclusions reached in NIE 29 and 29/1 and
to revise them, so as to take into account developments since
March and May.

SCOPE

This study should review the intelligence indications,
positive and negative, of a possible Soviet/satellite attack
on Yugoslavia. In addition, the following three major factors
should be re-examined to determine if they alter the conclusions
of NIE 29 and 29/1: (1) the development of the Satellite forces,
(2) the development of Yugoslav relations with the West, and
(3) the internal stability of Yugoslavia.

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NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1991

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QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

- I. WHAT INDICATIONS, POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE, OF A POSSIBLE ATTACK ON YUGOSLAVIA BY THE USSR AND/OR THE SATELLITES HAVE BEEN NOTED SINCE 1 MAY (date of NIE 29/1)?
- II. WHAT CHANGES HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN SOVIET/SATELLITE CAPABILITIES FOR AN ATTACK ON YUGOSLAVIA?
- A. Are the military programs of Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Albania designed for aggressive purposes against Yugoslavia, and do the tempo and scale of those programs have a direct bearing on the possibility of an attack on Yugoslavia?
 - B. Are the satellite forces now trained and equipped for action independent of Soviet forces, and are they trained for coordinated action with each other?
 - C. Has there been any significant build-up of Soviet forces in countries adjacent to Yugoslavia?
- III. WHAT CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED IN YUGOSLAV CAPABILITIES TO RESIST A SOVIET/SATELLITE ATTACK?
- A. Has Western economic and military assistance to Yugoslavia to date materially enhanced Yugoslav capabilities to resist a Soviet/satellite attack?
 - B. What effect will projected US economic and military aid have on Yugoslav capabilities to resist?

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- C. Do the Yugoslavs view their relations with the West, particularly the US, as sufficiently close as to constitute a guarantee of Western assistance in the event of an attack?

IV. IS THE TITO REGIME THREATENED BY INTERNAL INSTABILITY?

- A. Do current personnel shifts, purges, and charges of "Cominformism" within the Yugoslav Government and Communist party reflect any basic instability of the Tito regime?
1. How far up do these actions extend in the governmental and party hierarchies?
 2. To what extent are they related to Tito's efforts to improve relations with the West and to institute limited reforms within the government?
 3. To what extent is the charge of "Cominformism" used to cover other charges such as inefficiency, graft, failures in Party discipline, etc?
 4. Do these recent instances indicate increased effectiveness of Soviet/satellite propaganda or subversive activities within Yugoslavia?
- B. How serious are Tito's internal difficulties stemming from local problems rather than ideological differences?

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1. How effectively has Tito controlled the national and religious rivalries of Yugoslavia and what are the prospects for effective control in the future?
2. How serious is the peasant problem and what are the prospects for an effective solution?
3. Are there any effective non-Communist opposition groups within the country and, in view of the limitation on totalitarian methods which Tito's relations with the West will probably impose, are any such groups likely to develop?
- C. Are opposition elements within Yugoslavia, either Communist or non-Communist, likely to overthrow the Tito regime?

V. WHAT ARE PROBABLE SOVIET/SATELLITE INTENTIONS TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA?

- A. What is the probable Soviet estimate of the likelihood of the overthrow of the Tito regime by internal forces, either pro-Cominform or non-Communist?
- B. What is the probable Soviet estimate of satellite effectiveness in an attack on Yugoslavia?
 1. Could the satellite armies alone defeat Yugoslavia?
 2. If not, what degree of Soviet support and/or participation would be required?
- C. Would the Kremlin estimate that Yugoslav ties with the West are sufficiently close that an attack on Yugoslavia

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would probably result in Western intervention, thus greatly increasing the risk of general war?

- D. What is the relative likelihood of a Soviet/satellite attack on Yugoslavia? Has the possibility increased or decreased since preparation of NIE 29 and 29/1?

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT:

25X1A9A
DATE

These are the revised terms of reference on the Yugoslav paper which I mentioned to you this morning. Dr. Tanager would like to see them, and at that time we can determine whether the project should be done within O/N/E or sent to the IAC.